bose

Don't Militarize Diplomacy

On Jan. 14, there was a commemoration of the life and work of Richard Holbrooke, the American diplomat extraordinaire, and most recently Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, who died at the age of 69 on December 13. His true memorial, however, will come only if and when the war in Afghanistan is brought to an end in a way that does justice to the blood and treasure, Afghan and international, that has been spilt and spent over the last nine years. The lives of over 100,000 American troops, and millions of Afghans — never mind the future of Pakistan — depend on the right lessons of Holbrooke's service being applied now.

I got to know Holbrooke well over the last four years. Nicknamed the "bulldozer," he was more of a bulldog — with a fierce bark but a tender nature. The Afghanistan-Pakistan beat was not his job of choice, but he saw a patriotic duty in taking it on.

Holbrooke was a huge admirer of the bravery and intelligence of the U.S. military. But he cautioned against the "militarization of diplomacy." It is a resonant and important phrase. It is good that army commanders study the sociology as well as the topography of the countries in which they are deployed. But it is not a substitute for the diplomatic statecraft that makes for sustainable societies. David Petraeus would not be credited with turning Iraq round if it had not been for U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker.

Holbrooke knew from his experience from Vietnam to the Balkans that insurgencies and civil wars are never ended by force. They depend on a political settlement that holds firm on basic rules but also seek the widest possible accommodation of interests within the political system. In Afghanistan that means all the tribes in, al Qaeda out, the neighbors onside.

I read Steve Coll's Pulitzer Prize winning Ghost Wars over the holiday. He quotes Peter Tomsen, the U.S. Special Envoy to the Afghan Resistance, concluding in 1990 that the only model for governing Afghanistan was "the decades between 1919 and 1973 when Zahir Shah's weak but benign royal family governed from Kabul and a decentralised politics prevailed in the countryside, infused with Islamic faith and dominated by tribal or clan hierarchies".

There will be no Royal return to Kabul. But the political model is right. And Afghanistan needs that drive for a political settlement now. Foreign forces, now numbering 32,000 in Helmand province alone, are suppressing the insurgency. The military tempo, despite the winter, is unremitting, as special forces "disrupt and dismantle" — in other words kill — Taliban fighters.